Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015)
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 26

1990

FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS. By
George P. Smith, II. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas (1989).
Randy Howe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp

Recommended Citation
Randy Howe, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS. By George P. Smith, II. Illinois:
Charles C. Thomas (1989)., 6 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 449 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol6/iss1/26

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

1990]

Aids, Public Health and Legal Dimensions

HIV transmission; (2) To take care of HIV-infected persons (to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with HIV-infections; the care of HIV-infected persons is not limited to medical management or to AIDS or AIDSRelated Complex (ARC) patients; combatting discrimination against HIVinfected persons is as vital to the global strategy as provision of medical
care); and (3) To unify national and international AIDS control efforts.43 In
a recent symposium on AIDS," the special needs of healthcare workers internationally was addressed.4 5
Many well-written articles4 6 and books47 about both the public health aspects and legal issues surrounding the AIDS epidemic continue to appear.
Perhaps a scholarly analysis of international efforts to control AIDS by public health and legislative action will be forthcoming, but this book misses the
mark.

FINAL CHOICES:

AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS.

George P. Smith, II. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas. 1989. 198

Pp. $37.75.
Reviewed by Randy Howe, M.D. *
The core argument of this book is that competent individuals should be
permitted to take their own life so long as their decision is rational. This
43. Id. at 439-43.
44. Brandt, Health Care Workers and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 1 (1989).

45. Fluss & Zeegers, AIDS, HIV and Health Care Workers: Some InternationalLegislative Perspectives, 48 MD. L. REV. 77 (1989).

46. See, e.g., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Associated With Intravenous-Drug
Use-United States, 1988, 261 J. A.M.A. 2314 (1989); Dalakas, Wichman, & Sever, AIDS
and the Nervous System, 261 J. A.M.A. 2396 (1989); Turnock & Kelly, MandatoryPremarital
Testing for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 261 J. A.M.A. 3415 (1989); Joseph, Premarital
AIDS Testing: Public Policy Abandoned at the Altar, 261 J. A.M.A. 3456 (1989); Quinn, AIDS
in the Americas: An Emerging Public Health Crisis, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1005 (1989);

Howe, supra note 2; Matthews, supra note 3; Duncan, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2.
47. See, e.g., R. BAYER, PRIVATE AcTs, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1989); AIDS PROFILE, supra note 8; R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND
PLAYED ON (1987); AIDS AND THE LAW (H. Dalton, S. Burris and the Yale AIDS Law
Project eds. 1987); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AIDS: INFORMATION ON AIDS FOR
THE PRACTICING PHYSICIAN (1987); AIDS ETIOLOGY, supra note 1.
* Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Director of Programs in Ethics, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; Editor, Journal of Clinical Ethics. B.A., Yale University; M.D., Columbia University; J.D., Catholic University of America.
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argument is extended to incompetent patients, asserting that their option to
die without undue suffering or indignity should be equal to that of competent patients. If patients in either group need assistance in ending their lives,
under limited circumstances, active euthanasia should be permitted.
The critical assumption underlying these arguments is that there is a distinction between rational and irrational suicide which is morally significant.'
A rational decision, Professor Smith asserts, is choosing the course one
would prefer if one were in a "normal frame of mind" and death and all the
alternatives "correctly and vividly" lay before him.2 It is judged by the degree to which decisions are free of mysticism and have undergone self-criticism by the decisionmaker a Irrationality, on the other hand, is exemplified
when an individual, in a state of despair, abandons all-commitment to make
rational decisions. 4
Professor Smith considers voluntary euthanasia a form of rational suicide.
He asserts that "if committing ... suicide [was] recognized as but an exercise of enlightened self-determination, . . . euthanasia [would] be similarly re-

classified." 5 He believes that this rethinking would "show a new sensitivity
to the quality of life," and would enhance human dignity "by permitting
each man's last act to be an exercise of his free choice between a tortured,
hideous death and a painless dignified one. '
In addition to supporting his view by discussing historical precedents7 and
the legal feasibility of the changes he advocates,' Professor Smith presents
and analyzes sociological, psychological, and ethical perspectives. His selection of material is comprehensive and balanced. Consequently, this book
provides not only a well argued thesis, but a synthesis of current views and
controversies regarding the decision to allow or assist a patient to die.
The material Professor Smith brings to bear on this discussion is interesting in its own right, and, as in his other writings, he renders complex
1. G.

[hereinafter

SMITH, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
FINAL CHOICES].

x (1989)

2. Id.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7. See, e.g., id. at 4.
8. If voluntary active euthanasia were not de-criminalized as a consequence of the
re-classification scheme propounded, then surely an immunity from prosecution
should be allowed for those assisting in allowing a competent or incompetent individual to complete such an act of self-determination. Alternatively, the traditional concept of euthanasia could be allowed as an affirmative defense to a charge of murder
and accepted if the participating parties acted in good faith.
FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at xii (footnote omitted).
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thoughts both lucid and enjoyable to read. In this book, the latter, particularly, is no small accomplishment, considering the seriousness of the subject
matter.
Professor Smith builds his argument for substantive changes through the
first five chapters, and then, in the last chapter, discusses optimal procedures. This review will discuss Professor Smith's arguments in the same
order in which he presents them. It will amplify several issues he raises en
route to his conclusions, and examine how, if at all, this further analysis
might affect them.
CHAPTER I:

THE ETIOLOGY OF SUICIDE

In Chapter One, Professor Smith discusses the etiology of suicide. He
identifies, for instance, the frequent association of alcoholism and depression
with suicide9 and the causes of suicide in selected groups, such as the elderly,"° who tend to have more "genuine" intent, and teenagers, 1 who seem
exceptionally prone to committing "imitative" suicides. 2 He also analyzes
indirect self-destructive behaviors, such as smoking and skydiving.' 3
He then describes not only why persons participate in dangerous sports
but why others enjoy watching them, and asserts that these reasons have
significant implications regarding the likelihood that, in time, this society
will adopt his proposals.' 4 Behind all normal functioning is the fear of
death. Since this fear could be "totally debilitating" if it were ever-present, it
must be repressed.'" Therefore, participants engage in dangerous acts to
deny their fear of death and to replace this feeling with enhanced self-esteem;
and spectators identify vicariously with such participants also to deny
death.' 6 If the latter hypothesis is correct, he argues, society views these
potentially self-destructive acts with ambivalence or even condonation, and
may be more accepting of rational suicide and voluntary active euthanasia
than present circumstances might suggest. 7
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. See generally Wanzer, Federman, Adelstein, Cassel, Cassem, Cranford, Hook, Lo,
Moertel, Safar, Stone & Eys, The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients,320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989). For a most recent example, see Gianelli, Death By Injection
Ruled "Homicide,"But Prosecutor Opts Not to Charge MDs, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 19, 1990,
at 2, 43.
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Chapter One concludes by describing model legislation which would permit assisted suicide: Legally, physicians-or anyone-should be permitted
to furnish competent persons the means to take their life as long as these
persons take the last step."8 A mandatory witness might also be involved to
protect against foul play "masquerading as an assisted suicide." 9 Surrogate
decision-makers should have comparable immunity to insure that incompetent persons have the same protections as those who are competent.20
Professor Smith states that, notwithstanding these innovations, society
should continue to allow some interventions to prevent suicide.2 1 The ideal
standard for involuntary commitment would require that a mentally ill person lack "sufficient insight or capacity to make a rational decision concerning treatment.", 22 Although this standard is untested, it should go far to
23
protect the rights of patients who want to die.
As indicated, the linchpin of these arguments is that a "morally significant" difference exists between rational and irrational suicides. In theory,
these two categories are distinguishable, but unless, as a matter of practice,
irrational suicides can be identified and excluded, Professor Smith's proposals regarding rational suicide could not be applied.
"Irrational"Suicides Which Warrant Intervention
In his Introduction, Professor Smith distinguishes two kinds of suicide:
acts in which one intends to end one's life, and acts in which one intends
principally to bring about relief from some condition, knowing that certainly
or probably the result will be death. 24 This distinction is morally significant,
but in an opposite way from what might be deduced. 25
Persons who directly intend suicide may in part genuinely want to die, but
in part also be crying for help.2 6 With effective treatment, these patients
may no longer want to take their lives. A strong justification exists, at least
18. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 23.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 29 (quoting Herman, Barriersto Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of
Revision in Procedural,Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commit-

ment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 84, 100 (1986)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at ix.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Jensen & Petty, The Fantasy of Being Rescued in Suicide, 27 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 327, 327 (1958). See generally Shneidman, Suicide Thoughts and Reflections (19601980), 11 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 198 (1981).
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initially, for intervening to prevent these individuals from attempting
suicide.
Patients who have a condition that causes them unbearable pain, on the
other hand, have learned over time that they cannot obtain relief from their
physical or mental condition. In these instances, a stronger justification exists for not intervening, but rather for permitting these patients to die by
refusing treatment or in some cases, as Professor Smith urges, for assisting
them.
Imitative Suicides and Other Suicides Which May Involve "Suggestion"
Some patients attempt suicide seemingly in response to having learned of
others' attempts.27 This phenomenon of "contagious," "cluster," or "imitative" suicides has been recognized for many years.28 Over two centuries ago,
for example, it was observed that a rash of persons had attempted suicide
after the publication of Goethe's book about a young man who committed
suicide.29
Since these suicidal impulses are likely to be short-lived, paternalistic intervention can be justified. The boundaries of this category and others, however, may be unclear. A patient's reasons for wanting to die may have both
an imitative and rational component. One example is a patient hospitalized
due to AIDS who first expresses the desire to refuse life-prolonging treatment after another patient with AIDS on the same ward has attempted or
committed suicide.
Other patients may refuse treatment not to imitate another patient, but for
much the same psychological reason: they, too, also respond to suggestion.
For instance, consider a retired clinical psychologist with aplastic anemia
who had been hospitalized for several months. Since his body could no
longer make blood or platelets, he needed periodic blood and platelet transfusions to keep him alive. He could have lived on indefinitely in the hospital,
but a new careprovider discovered that the patient had never been told that
he could refuse further treatment. Accordingly, the careprovider informed
the patient of his right and asked the patient whether he wished to discontinue treatment. The next day the patient requested that the blood and
27. Robbins & Convoy, A Cluster ofAdolescent Suicide Attempts: Is Suicide Contagious?,

3 J.

ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE

253, 254 (1983); Rubinstein, Epidemic Suicide Among Mi-

cronesian Adolescents, 17 Soc. SC. MED. 657, 659 (1983); Bollen & Philipps, Imitative Suicides: A National Study of the Effects of Television News Stories, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 802, 803
(1982); Phillips, The Influence of Suggestion on Suicide: Substantive and Theoretical Implications of the Werther Effect, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 340, 350-51 (1974).

28.

FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 13.
29. GOETHE, THE SORROWS OF YOUNG WERTHER

(1787).
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platelet transfusions be discontinued. His request was granted and he died
shortly thereafter.
It is impossible to know in this or any case whether "suggestion" is the
true basis for a patient's decision. This careprovider's intervention, conventionally, would be considered optimal since it enhanced the patient's autonomy and gave the patient "permission" to refuse treatment. Yet, this
patient's family visited him daily for several hours and the patient knew that
as a result of these visits, they could not pursue personal goals incompatible
with these visits. It is possible that the patient felt guilty that his family
might be sacrificing some of their interests for his, and, as a result of this
guilt, the careprovider's questions and/or non-verbal communication suggested to the patient that he should refuse treatment.
The complexity of the careprovider's intervention in the above case is best
understood in a broader context. It is generally assumed that the careprovider's questioning of the patient about suicidal thoughts will decrease,
rather than increase, the likelihood that the patient will commit suicide, because it gives the patient an opportunity to verbalize suicidal feelings. Yet,
when patients require ongoing hospitalization for the rest of their lives, they
are exceptionally vulnerable to feeling that they pose a burden to their family, and/or to other patients and society because they are utilizing limited
medical resources.
When a careprovider offers such patients the option to refuse treatment,
therefore, an opposite effect from the one which is intended may result. Instead of enhancing autonomy by providing another choice, it may evoke in
patients the belief that they should refuse treatment for others' sake, though,
for their own sake, they would want to continue to live.
Careproviders unwittingly may pose a further dilemma to a patient by
suggesting implicitly: that he should want to live. Consider a patient who
had terminal cancer, was being treated in an intensive care unit (ICU) for a
serious bodily infection, and became comatose. He had not indicated previously what he would want done in the event he lost consciousness. He
awoke after several days in a coma, and when asked what interventions he
would want in the event he again became comatose, he indicated that he
would want all possible treatments. After he left the hospital, however, during a brief period of remission, he stated that he wished life-prolonging treatment had been withheld so that he could have died while comatose.
It is possible that between the time he first stated his preference and later
said the reverse, this patient changed his mind. Yet, he also may have responded initially in the ICU to what he believed his questioner wanted to
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hear. In cases such as these, it may be difficult or impossible to differentiate
rational suicide from imitative or "suggested" suicide.
Indirect Suicides
Professor Smith's assertion that some persons commit suicide indirectly
by acts such as smoking or skydiving is, descriptively, correct. Psychologically, however, there may be other reasons. Persons may participate in dangerous acts, for instance, because they enjoy them, and not because of the
risk of death but in spite of it.
The motivation Professor Smith attributes to spectators also has been
noted. Speaking of "death-defying" circus acts, he asserts that spectators
identify with the circus performers, and, as the performers defy death, feel
momentarily elated and immortal.3 ° "Surely, if a large segment of... society... [views] indirect self-destructive behaviors withambivalence ....hope
...exists for direct forms of enlightened self-determination... to be toler31
ated ... in due course.,
Yet, as Professor Smith indicates, societal ambivalence, like the proverbial
knife, can cut both ways. Society's "exaggerated fear of death" also impairs
its taking a more enlightened view towards patients who refuse treatment.32
He asks rhetorically, "Should patients' freedom to refuse treatment be sacrificed so that others can deny the fear of death," and answers, unequivocally,
that it should not.33
Professor Smith's assertion that this population's fear of death is a significant factor in its opposition to voluntary euthanasia is subject to debate.
There are other, comparably plausible explanations. Yet, it is at least consistent with, if not supportive of Professor Smith's speculation that this society's current "paternalistic view" towards euthanasia is exceptional. In
other areas of medical decisionmaking, the United States places higher value
on respecting patients' autonomy than most other countries.
Suicides To Make a Point
An intriguing category of suicides which Professor Smith identifies is that
of persons who die to "make a point," such as those who undergo a hunger
strike.34 The Roman Catholic Church views such individuals differently
from those who commit suicide for other reasons.3 5 A secular example of
30. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 16.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id. at 36 n.112. See generally M. BAT-rIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 147 (1982).
35. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 36.
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36
this distinction was recognized in a holding of the Georgia Supreme Court,
which declared that under the United States Constitution, a state has no
right to prevent a prisoner from starving himself to death to make a point or
37
statement.
This holding is, however, discrepant from that of the few other appellate
courts which have addressed this question. In the best known case, Mark
Chapman, convicted killer of former Beatle John Lennon, wanted to die by
starvation.3 8 He argued that death by starvation was "symbolic speech"
protected by the first amendment.3 9 The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the state's obligation to protect the health and welfare of persons in its custody and its interest in maintaining orderly procedures in its institutions prevailed over any right of an
institutionalized person to cause his own death.' ° A court in Massachusetts
went still further and rejected a prisoner's request to refuse kidney dialysis
on similar grounds.4 1
Even when suicides to make a point are ostensibly rational, the boundary
between these and irrational suicides may be uncertain. Patients may refuse
nutrition and hydration to prove to family members that they retain power
even though they are patients. This scenario is especially likely, for example,
when patients believe that family members are demeaning or infantilizing
them. Should this motivation be considered starving to make a point?42

Rational Suicides
Excluding, then, a wide-range of irrational suicides, such as those described above, when should a person's suicidal wishes be considered rational? Centuries ago, it was assumed that a person's capacity for reasoning
was cut off from other parts of the brain, and thus, that a person's reasoning
could remain intact even when other parts of the brain had been severely
36. Id. at 40 n.214 (citing Zant v. Prevante, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982)).
37. Id. (citing Zant, 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717).
38. Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
39. Id. at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
40. Id. at 67, 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
41. Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 265-66, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458
(1979). The New York and Massachusetts courts, however, implicitly recognized a distinction
between suicides to make a point and other suicides. Von Holden, 87 A.D.2d at 70, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 627; Myers, 379 Mass. at 259, 399 N.E.2d at 454. The balancing approach exemplified in all three courts parallels Professor Smith's approach in deciding whether a patient
should be allowed or assisted to die.
42. One author reports a case in which a young woman shot herself rather than her dog
when her parents insisted that she kill her dog as punishment for coming in late at night. He
questions whether this act should be classified as an act of suicide. Beauchamp, Suicide, in
MATrERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 78-79 (T. Regan ed. 1980).
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damaged. If individuals were profoundly depressed, it was believed that this
feeling would not affect their thinking.
It is now acknowledged that persons' brain chemistry, emotions, and
thought processes are profoundly and inextricably interrelated. Persons may
think logically when they are depressed but the logic itself may be skewed or
otherwise altered.4 a Depressed persons may see, literally, only those aspects
of an experience which have self-derogatory implications. Then, they may
make inferences on the basis of these perceptions which, though "logical,"
are fallacious. Cognitive therapy, a psychological treatment particularly effective for depression, helps depressed persons become aware of such "sampling errors" so that they can recognize and correct them.
Professor Smith implicitly recognizes that emotions can affect reasoning
when he emphasizes the importance of giving patients sufficient time after
they first express a desire to refuse treatment to better determine whether the
request is "genuine." "Perhaps, after a waiting period of some six months
wherein .. .psychological counseling can be given, a re-evaluation . ..
[sh]ould be made.""
The importance of permitting such time before granting patients their request to refuse treatment is exemplified when persons suffer a sudden injury,
such as a car accident, which renders them quadriplegic. Immediately after
the accident, these persons may want to refuse treatment for such "rational
reasons" as having lost the capacity to walk and eat independently, their
previous lifestyle and their anticipated future. Many of these individuals,
however, after several months, may be glad that they are alive and want to
continue living.4 5
When initially deciding whether to respect a patient's request to be allowed to die, two considerations are potentially relevant: First, is their condition reversible; and second, if it is not, does past experience with other
persons, similarly situated, suggest that those with such losses are likely to
later accept their limitations and eventually to enjoy their radically altered
lives. If the condition is reversible or it is likely that the patient with irreversible impairment will subsequently "do well," a strong, but by no means
43. Brandt, The Morality andRationality ofSuicide, in A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF
SUICIDE 380 (S. Perlin ed. 1975). See generally Neuringer, Rigid Thinking in SuicidalIndividuals, 29 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 54 (1964).
44. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 152.
45. See, e.g., Hassatt & Wear, An Ethical Challengein CriticalCare: The Severely Injured

Patient, 2 J. CRITICAL CARE 194, 196 (1987); Gardner, Theocleous, Watt & Krishman, Ventilation or Dignified Death for Patients with High Tetraplegia, 291 BRIT. MED. J. 1620, 1623
(1985). But see Maynard & Muth, The Choice to End Life as a Ventilator-Dependent
Quadriplegic, 68 ARCH. PHYS. MED. REH. 862, 862 (1987).
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conclusive, argument exists for paternalistic intervention immediately after
the traumatic injury.
Professor Smith discusses, by contrast, the request of Ms. Elizabeth
Bouvia 4 6 to die by starvation in a hospital. Ms. Bouvia had been functionally quadriplegic since birth and had had her entire life to accept her handicap. In this instance, neither of the above considerations were present. How
in such cases can it be determined whether a patient's request is "genuine?"
Assessing the Competence of Patients Who Request That They be Allowed
to Die
Professor Smith points out that persons should not be deemed incompetent solely because they wish to make a choice which will result in their
death.4 7 In certain jurisdictions, the criteria for judging a patient incompetent to refuse life-prolonging interventions may depend on the possible outcomes for the patient.4 8
The latter so-called "shifting standards of competency 49 approach works
as follows: When there is little difference in the possible outcomes for a
patient, the best criteria for competency may be those which give patients
the greatest opportunity to decide which outcome they prefer. Some patients are so severely burned, for instance, that it is known with virtual certainty that they will die within several days. 5° These patients often
experience an initial lucid period before becoming comatose, and during this
period they can be asked whether they would prefer "ordinary" or "heroic"
treatment after they subsequently lapse into a coma."1
When asked this question, these patients' physiology is significantly altered, and they are profoundly affected psychologically from having just
learned that they will lose consciousness in hours and die within days. A
"lax" standard of competency which requires only that patients respond yes
or no, consistently, to questions regarding their preferences may be optimal
because it permits these patients greatest autonomy.
46. Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (1986).
47. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 38. Accord Culver, Ferrell & Green, ECT and Special Problems of Informed Consent, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 586, 587 (1980).
48. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 14. See generally Drane, The Many Facesof Competency, 15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17 (1985); Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
49. This approach is also known as the "sliding scale" or "rational standard" model. See
Drane, supra note 48, at 18.
50. Imbus & Zawacki, Autonomy for Burned Patients When Survival is Unprecedented,
297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 308 (1977).
51. Id. at 309-10.
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Other patients' outcomes, however, are highly discrepant. One example is
the diabetic patient who has a gangrenous leg. Surgery will be life-saving,
but without it, the patient probably will die. A "strict" standard of competency might be optimal in this instance because it would permit factors other
than the patient's literal rationality, such as the patient's mood - which could
be the cause of the patient's refusing surgery - to be taken into account.
Under a strict standard requiring more than literal understanding, such patients could be judged legally incompetent, and the surgery performed.
Consider an unusual case which demonstrates the advantage of using
shifting criteria to determine competency. A patient who had appeared to
enjoy his life in a nursing home developed sudden pain in his abdomen.
Since a relative had died after initially experiencing a similar pain, the patient believed his own pain was also the first symptom of a fatal disease. On
this basis, he refused surgery. His doctors tried to convince him that they
believed that he had appendicitis, but the patient remained adamant in his
refusal. The hospital staff finally overrode the patient's objections and performed an appendectomy. After the operation the patient thanked the staff
profusely for most likely having saved his life.
The lax standard which only requires that patients show literal understanding most respects patients' autonomy, but it also may result in the
death of more patients, such as the one just described; namely, patients who
"genuinely" want to live, but are convinced that a highly improbable circumstance is present or are temporarily overwhelmed by an emotion such as
fear or depression. Conversely, the strict standard, which requires deeper
understanding, may "save" the lives of more patients who genuinely want to
live but at the price of denying autonomy, or in Professor Smith's words, the
right to enlightened self-determination. 52 The strict criterion also permits
greater inconsistency among psychiatrists' judgements, because psychiatrists
may differ in the findings they consider most important when they determine
53
a patient's incompetency.
When determining competency, physicians also may look to their own
ethical views in the exercise of discretion. Physicians may be more like, for.
instance, to infer that a patient is incompetent and consult a psychiatrist
only when they feel that a patient's choice is "wrong."
Who, then, should decide which criteria should be used when physicians
are uncertain? When the strict standard requiring deeper understanding is
used and psychiatrists disagree regarding a patient's competency, who
52. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 28.
53. Howe, Forensic Issues in Critical Care Medicine, 2

180-81 (1988).

PROBLEMS CRITICAL CARE 171,
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should decide? And who should decide when it is necessary to consult a
psychiatrist? All these questions may be referred to the court, but, as Professor Smith states in the last chapter, referral to an ethics committee is likely
54
to be preferable, in most instances, for all parties involved.
CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING SUICIDE
In Chapter Two, Professor Smith analyzes philosophical views regarding
persons who refuse life prolonging treatment or request active euthanasia.
Initially, he raises the question whether the quality of a person's life or life
itself is of greater value, but asserts that this question usually is answered by
assessing costs and benefits."
He declares that it has become increasingly difficult to justify permitting
"a slow and dehumanizing death" over assisting persons to die with dignity.56 Traditionally, physicians "pre-empted" patient authority when making medical decisions." Although there has been a shift from professional
dominance towards individual self-determination, the law has not yet responded in a "sufficiently forceful . . . manner" to recognize patient
autonomy.58
Professor Smith then offers several rationales for permitting most patients
to refuse life-prolonging treatments. The primary reason, to respect individuals' autonomy, was expressed by Mill over a century ago.59 One of the few
justifications Mill recognized for interfering with another's liberty was to
restore or enhance that person's ultimate autonomy.' In Mill's view, this
restoration would be the only rationale for paternalistically intervening when
patients' wish to commit suicide was irrational,61 as in some of the situations
previously discussed.
Other Groundsfor PaternalisticInterventions
Professor Smith indicates three conditions which must be present to justify paternalistic medical interventions: a high probability of harm to the
patient unless the act is undertaken; a failure by the patient to understand or
rationally reflect on the questioned decision; and a probable benefit from
54. FINAL

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at

CHOICES,

supra note 1, at 171-80.

46.
47.
52.
53.
51. See generally J. MILL, ON
FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 51.
Id.

LIBERTY

(1974).
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intervention outweighing that of inaction.6 2 Even when these conditions are
met, however, a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis should be carried out
and the "proportionality" of all other morally significant factors should also
be considered.6 3
Interests of Family Members
Professor Smith states that one important "other factor" in determining
whether or not a patient should be permitted to refuse treatment or assisted
to die is the interests of third parties." 4 In particular, the interests of a patient's family are important, since the family is likely to be closest to the
patient and most directly affected by the patient's choices.6 5
Currently, there is general societal consensus that as long as a patient has
a terminal illness, the patient's wish when competent, or prior wish and/or
burden-benefit ratio when incompetent, should be the exclusive factor(s) determining the outcome. But are there any situations in which families' and/
or friends' interests and feelings ought to have sufficient moral weight to
affect a patient's decision to die? Could it be argued that when a patient is
incompetent and has stated that he or she wants no "extraordinary" treatment, but the family wants the patient kept alive, so long as the patient
experiences no pain, the family's wishes should override the patient's
preference?
Family members' wishes are often prioritized when a comatose patient is
kept alive a day or two longer so family members can travel to have some
time with the patient before the patient dies or so family members who have
been with the patient can have additional time to grieve. Although additional expense is incurred in order to benefit such families, it is not inconsistent with additional expenses incurred to benefit families in other ways, for
example, when physicians take extra time to explain to family members
medical aspects of a patient's illness. Keeping a patient alive for just a short
period of time would seem, then, to exemplify the kind of situation Professor
62. Id. at 53-54.
63. Id. at 54.
64. Id. at 155.
65.

One author's statement after his son committed suicide is representative of the agony

some parents feel: "We know that Michael's death will shadow our remaining hours on earth
[sic]." J. WESCHLER, IN A DARKNESS 12 (1972), quoted in Emery, Adolescent Depression and
Suicide, 18 ADOLESCENCE 245, 250 (1983).
To some, the harm to family members alone makes suicide unjustifiable. See generally

Hendin, Suicide: A Review of New Directions in Research, 37 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY
148 (1986); H. FEDDEN, SUICIDE: A SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY 209 (1983); Lebacqz &
Engelhardt, Suicide, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 695-96 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds.

1977).

462

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:437

Smith has in mind when he recommends that the proportionality of third
parties' interests be considered.
A more controversial question exists when a patient with cortical, but not
brainstem "death" has indicated that he or she would not want to be kept
alive, but the family disagrees and wants life prolonging measures carried
out indefinitely. In jurisdictions where physicians are not required to carry
out patients' prior requests, physicians may respect such families' wishes to
benefit the family and/or to avoid the risk of the family's bringing suit.
When the family's wishes are given priority, in addition to violating the patient's prior request, hospital and societal resources are expended. It is unclear, however when physicians would ever be ethically justified in carrying
out a family's desire to keep a patient alive over and against the patient's
prior wishes for more than a few days' time.
The reverse situation also can occur. A patient can have cortical death
and have indicated that he or she would want to be kept alive in this condition, but family members may disagree. In rare instances, persons have
risked criminal prosecution to bring about the death of a relative who was in
an irreversible comatose state. Presumably, such persons' motivation would
be less strong when a patient had indicated that he or she wanted to be kept
alive. Regardless, if family interests prevailed under these circumstances, in
addition to violating patients' prior requests, patients who were competent
could anticipate that if they became incompetent, their family's wishes might
prevail. It could be assumed that this foreknowledge would cause significant
harm. But would it?
Certain patients might want their family's interests to take priority if they
were incompetent and their own interests were in conflict with their family's.
The durable power of attorney is, paradoxically, one means by which patients who want family or friends to exercise their preference could effect this
wish. Although appointed to make decisions on the basis of what they believe the patient would want, these persons could, to a certain degree, make
choices on the basis of their own desires.
.Alternatively, patients could waive their own preference and delegate it to
family members explicitly. One women in her eighties who knew that she
was dying, for instance, instructed her son that if she lost consciousness, she
wanted him to do what he preferred for his own sake. If such a request is
well-documented, it probably would be respected.
Interests of Other Patientsand Society
Professor Smith suggests that, in addition to families' interests, other pa-
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tients' and society's interests also should be considered when determining
patients' outcomes.
[I]n the final analysis, . . . [t]he root question of suicide or its
"rightness" is tied to one of distributive justice-and, more specifically, of the achievement of a balance between the benefits of an
individual's exercise of self-determination and personal good or
satisfaction against the burdens, social obligations or claims of
others that militate against such an act." s
Interests of other patients and society usually are not considered, at least
explicitly in this country, when care is withheld or withdrawn. Still, when
more than one patient needs an ICU bed, a patient with a poor prognosis
may be transferred from the ICU to an ordinary ward, even though it could
result in greater morbidity for the patient transferred. In actuality, however,
these transfers may make little or no difference in these patients' eventual
outcome.67
If the competing needs of patients becomes a more acceptable ground for
giving certain patients' interests priority over others, the doctor-patient relationship also may be affected.68 If a physician chooses which of his or her
own patients receive a limited resource, the patients may no longer trust that
their physician primarily seeks to maximize their welfare. Unless implicitly
deceiving a patient by remaining silent when making "triage" decisions, the
physician might have to tell one patient needing ICU care that although he
or she could benefit from being admitted to the ICU, the physician was admitting another patient to the one available bed because this patient had a
better prognosis. If, however, careproviders or others outside the treatment
relationship, or even an ethics committee made these decisions, 69 this loss of
trust perhaps could be minimized or avoided.
The Elderly
A closely related question which Professor Smith addresses, though primarily in a later chapter, is the degree, if any, to which age should be a
factor when deciding who should receive limited medical resources. 70 Ethical arguments regarding this question are less than compelling. From a utilitarian perspective, it can be argued that since elderly patients have fewer
66. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 59-60.
67. Strauss, Lo Gerfo, Yeltazie, Temkin & Hudson, Rationing of Intensive Care Unit Services: An Everyday Occurrence, 255 J. A.M.A 1143, 1146 (1986).
68. Taylor, Pity the Poor Gatekeeper: A TransatlanticPerspective on Cost Containment in
Clinical Practice,299 BRIT. MED. J. 1323, 1325 (1989).
69. Farley, InstitutionalEthics Committees as Social Justice Advocates, 65 HEALTH PROG.
32, 35 (1984).
70. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 133-34.
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statistical years to live, it might not be unjust to expect them to sacrifice their
optimal medical interests to benefit younger patients. Such arguments tend
to be biased inherently against older persons' interests. 7
On the basis of one interpretation of justice as equity in which the value of
persons' lives are viewed at only one point in time, an older patient's life is as
important as a younger life. Yet, on the basis of another interpretation of
justice as equity in which the value of persons' lives is viewed longitudinally,
older persons have had the opportunity to live much longer than younger
persons. Accordingly, it would be just to give more societal resources to
younger persons.
How society decides to distribute its resources may best be determined by
the kind of community desired. 72 If this statement is true, it is significant
that when Professor Smith argues that a community should be willing to
allow (a few of) its members to exercise enlightened self-determination even
at the expense of the interests of the greater population (in denying death), 7
implicitly, he is asserting that society should sacrifice an important interest
to benefit its more vulnerable persons. If older persons are considered exceptionally vulnerable at least in the respect that they statistically face an earlier
death, similarly, a community which would sacrifice some of its interests for
them may be desirable.
Denying Care Which is Medically Futile
Another approach to conserving resources which Professor Smith addresses is withholding or withdrawing "medically futile" care. 74 This issue
is presently controversial.7 5 Some physicians assert that when resuscitation
of a patient is medically futile, physicians should write a Do-Not-Resuscitate
(DNR) order without asking the patient's consent and need not even inform
the patient, except, perhaps, as a courtesy. 76 Others argue that patients always should have the choice of withholding consent for a DNR order.77
There are many meanings of futility. Futility can refer to a patient's not
being expected to leave the hospital. A few years ago, for instance, the likelihood that a patient with AIDS who had pneumocystis pneumonia and had
71. Avorn, Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care, 310 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1294,
1295 (1984). See generally, Howe, EthicalAspects of GeriatricPatients'Rights to Refuse Treatment and to Receive Limited Medical Resources, 14 EDUCATIONAL GERONTOLOGY 451
(1988).
72. Youngner, Who Defines Futility, 260 J. A.M.A. 2094, 2095 (1988).
73. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 136-38.
74. Id. at 173-74.
75. See Youngner, supra note 72.
76. Younger, supra note 72, at 2094.
77. Id. at 2095.
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been intubated would leave the hospital was fourteen percent.7" This figure
is low enough that some physicians and patients might consider aggressive
care to be futile.7 9
A different meaning of futility is that a patient will not improve. This
meaning was used when careproviders at one hospital debated whether surgery should be performed on a severely retarded infant whose mental capacity could not improve. Yet, this infant's parents cared deeply for this child,
and from their standpoint, the surgery was anything but futile. Should the
positive feelings of others toward a patient have independent and sometimes
decisive moral weight when the infant lacks inherent "human" capacities,
such as the ability to think, feel, and relate to others?
Jecker argues that others' love for a patient is an "extrinsic" factor which,
like "intrinsic" factors, should contribute to a person's worth."0 Alternatively, Loewy argues that the relief of humans' suffering should be prioritized over other values.8 " On the basis of either perspective, parents' positive
feelings for infants with severe defects could affect decisions regarding these
infants to a much greater extent.
The least controversial meaning of futility as a ground for physicians
withholding or withdrawing interventions is when there exists an extremely
low probability that the intervention will be successful, as when the likelihood of the patient's recovering from cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
is less than one percent.8 2 Yet, when physicians discuss the improbability of
successful CPR with patients, many patients may accept the DNR order,
whereas, if physicians make this decision themselves, patients may experience distrust. The preservation of patient/physician trust relationship may
warrant the expenditure of resources used in performing CPR on the few
patients who do not consent to a DNR order.
But is such patients' distrust warranted? Possibly. If physicians decide
that CPR is futile to further the competing interests of other patients, as
when physicians decide which of their own patients should receive a limited
78. Steinbrook, Lo, Tirpack, Dilley & Volberding, Ethical Dilemmas in Caring for Patients With Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 101 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 787, 788

(1985).
79. Id.
80. Jecker, The Moral Status of Patients Who are Not Strict Persons, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHics (1990) (in press).
81. Loewy, The Role of Suffering and Community in Clinical Ethics, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHics (1990) (in press).
82. See generally Murphy, Murray, Robinson & Campion, Outcomes of Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in the Elderly, 111 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 199 (1989). See also Gold, Jablonski,
Christensen, Shapero & Schiedermayer, Is There a Right to Futile Treatment? The Case of a
Dying Patient with AIDS, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS (1990) (in press).
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resource, physicians may no longer be serving the best interests of each of
their patients.
Yet, when physicians decide that an intervention is futile, they may do so
for another reason; because they believe that a patient faces imminent death
and must be helped to accept his or her fate. These physicians are trying
primarily to further what they believe is in such patients' best interests.
Whether they are justified or not, they are likely to be acting out of
compassion.
The Placefor Compassion
Professor Smith suggests that when physicians make particularly difficult
decisions, they should use as a guideline what seems most "loving." 3 "Love
should be the basic normative value used in each situation to resolve the
balancing test." 4
In making this statement, implicitly, at least, Professor Smith seem to be
bringing to bear on these questions the so-called "care perspective," stemming from the work of Dr. Carol Gilligan. 5 This perspective emphasizes
persons' relationships to one other, such as careproviders' relationship with
their patients and patients' relationship with their families, as opposed to the
more traditional approach which emphasizes the identification ofprimafacie
principles, such as respect for persons, justice or utility. 6
The relevance of the care perspective to resolving ethical dilemmas is,
however, controversial. Some believe that the care perspective is fundamen87
tally adjunctive to these principles and may sometimes even oppose them.
Others believe that this perspective is basically unnecessary and superfluous,
because the importance of persons' relationships already is inherent in ethical principles, and particularly those of beneficence and non-maleficence.8 8
If there is a valid difference between these perspectives, consider a case
which may be seen as posing a conflict between them. For reasons that were
unclear, a patient with untreatable metastatic cancer became comatose. His
doctors believed that he had only a small chance of recovery. The patient's
spouse was considered the most appropriate surrogate decision-maker. She
83. FINAL CHOICES, supra 1, at 46.
84. Id. at 46-47. See Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliativeor Apotheosis?
63 NEB. L. REv. 709, 734-35 (1984). See also Fletcher, Love is the Only Measure, 83 CoMMONWEALTH 427 (1966).

85. C. GILLIGAN,

IN A DIFFERENT VOICE

(1982).

86. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 46-47.
87. See generally Levine, Medical Ethics and PersonalDoctors: Conflicts Between What
We Teach and What We Want, 13 AM. J.L. MED. 351 (1987).
88. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 47.
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asserted that, when her husband was competent, he had stated clearly that
life-prolonging interventions such as a respirator should not be continued
under these circumstances. The patient's parents and siblings, on the other
hand, believed that the patient was a "fighter" who would want all interventions continued so long as there was any chance of his regaining
consciousness.
The staff had two views on how to resolve the spouse's and family's disagreement. One view was that since the spouse was the most appropriate
decision maker, the staff should help her decide what interventions should be
withheld and help the family to accept the spouse's judgement. The opposing view was that the staff should attempt to help the spouse and family to
arrive at a compromise which both could accept. This second view was
based largely on the fear that if the spouse decided, the patient's family
might resent her so strongly that their relationship with the spouse would be
irreparably harmed. This outcome was particularly undesirable because the
patient and his wife had children. The first view, to allow the spouse to
decide, was based on determining the priority of conflicting moral principles;
the latter, on the overriding importance of the spouse's and family's
relationship.
A second case also illustrating a possible conflict between these two perspectives involves a terminally ill, unconscious woman who had a small
chance of regaining consciousness. Her closest relative was an adult daughter suffering from a severe chronic mental illness. This daughter insisted
that her mother would want all possible interventions, but more distant relatives and staff reported that the patient had told them that she would not
want "heroic" treatment or even CPR under these circumstances.
The staff struggled with the decision of whether to take initiative to appoint a family member other than the daughter as the patient's guardian.
They believed that this initiative would further to a small degree the patient's best interest. They also feared that if a guardian was appointed, the
highly supportive and harmonious relationship between the daughter and
other family members, one of whom would most likely be the guardian,
could be destroyed.
Slippery Slope Arguments
Professor Smith identifies two slippery slope arguments that have been
raised against active euthanasia.89 The first is the possibility that permitting
euthanasia could open the door to practices being carried out in this country
89. Id. at 60.
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9
comparable to the atrocities committed in Germany during World War II.
While theoretically possible, it is most implausible for several reasons, including that "the forced homogeneity of the Nazi society doesn't exist in
America today." 9 1
He further asserts that this most unlikely possibility must be weighed
against the certainty of harms which would occur as a result of limiting
patients' right to having assistance in ending their lives.9 2 Merely withdrawing life-prolonging interventions would result in some patients experiencing
unbearable and unnecessary pain for several days. 93 Sufficient pain medication can now be given to most patients to make their pain bearable - but not
94
to all.
Patients' emotional pain may, in some cases, also be refractory to treatment, as when a patient finds no pleasure or meaning in continuing to live. 95
Permitting active euthanasia for patients with untreatable emotional pain,
however, illustrates more clearly than for patients with untreatable physical
pain a potential danger in Professor Smith's proposal. That is, when patients
are suffering emotionally or physically, it may be that their pain could be
relieved. If the option of assisted euthanasia is available, however, it may be
selected "prematurely," before it is discerned that an intervention is
effective.
The second slippery slope argument Professor Smith addresses is psychological: Persons performing euthanasia could come to have less regard for
the sanctity of life. 96 Even if this result is a risk, it should be no different
from the adverse risk to careproviders from withholding or withdrawing lifeprolonging interventions.
Both of the latter now, of course, are permissible,97 and there is no evidence that careproviders withholding or withdrawing these treatments have
been harmed. It may be with active as passive euthanasia that the psychological effect on careproviders depends on the meaning of these acts to them.
In both instances, physicians may see themselves as "saving" patients from

90. Id.
91. Id. at 61. See D. MAJURE, DEATH BY CHOICE 134 (1975); Wanzer, supra note 17.
92. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 56.
93. Id. at 93.
94. Id. at 61. Professor Smith cites as an exception a patient whose kidneys have failed.
Without dialysis and transplant surgery, the patient "will normally experience... nausea and
vomiting, an inability to concentrate and - eventually - convulsions." Id. at 93.
95. But see Brown, Henteleff & Barakat, Is It Normalfor Terminally Ill Patients to Desire
Death?, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 208, 210 (1986) (most patients who are terminally ill do not
wish to die unless they are depressed).
96. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 61.
97. Id. at 155.
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experiencing unbearable pain; accordingly, they may justifiably feel some
98
gratification from doing these acts.
Physicians Refusing to Act on the Basis of Personal Values
Professor Smith then discusses whether physicians should ever be obligated to assist a patient to die when doing so would violate physicians' personal morality. 99 "[N]o force or coercion can be extended to compel a
physician to proceed with a treatment ... if that physician considers [it to
' °
violate] . . . an ethical, moral, or professional obligation. '""
In a earlier

chapter and in a different context, this caution is added: "[V]igilance must
ever be maintained ... to safeguard against the physician's ready eagerness
to substitute one form or another of 'motivated' paternalism for his patient's
right of enlightened self-determination." ' ' Could physicians not also substitute "one form or another" of their personal morality also to undermine
this right?
It is unequivocal that physicians can and should be permitted to refuse to
carry out acts which strongly violate their moral beliefs. The paradigmatic
example is abortion. In less "viscerally offensive" instances, no doubt, this
principle also should apply. A physician probably would be justified in refusing to comply with a patients' request that a physician (implicitly) deceive
the patient's family by not informing the family that the patient has a fatal
illness.102

Certain physicians have extended this principle much further, carrying
out a "slow code" because they hold the "moral view" that if resuscitation is
successful, further treatment for a patient would be a misuse of society's
resources. Others have refused to treat patients with HIV infection, because
they hold the "moral view" that if a physician died as a result of a needlestick, the loss to the physician's patients would outweigh the gain he or she
could offer patients with HIV infection by treating them.
Physicians refusing to perform an abortion or to deceive family members,
98. In some instances, careproviders have given care only arguably distinct from active

euthanasia. Sufficient analgesia has been given in hospices to relieve patients' pain though this
medication may in some cases hasten patients' deaths. As a second example, doctors sometimes give infants with irreversible, cortical brain death dosages of pain-relieving drugs prior to
removing them from the ventilator to ensure that the infants do not suffer from "air hunger."
These dosages, too, may hasten these infants' death.
99. Id. at 120.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 54.
102. Howe, supra note 53, at 174-76. See also Howe, When Physicians Impose Values on
Patients: An Ethics Consultant's Responsibilities, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH
CARE 144-46 (J. Fletcher, N. Quist & A. Jonsen eds. 1989).
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presumably, are ethically justified. Performing a slow code or refusing to
treat patients with HIV infection, for these reasons at least, is questionable
and perhaps egregious.
Physicians who would refuse to perform active euthanasia on the basis of
personal moral beliefs surely would fall in the former category. Yet, physicians who hold such beliefs also would have affirmative obligations to anticipate when these beliefs could conflict with patients' interests and, in the
event of this conflict, to inform such patients as early as possible. If they do
not, they could place on patients who are already ill the unnecessary burden
of having to find another physician, and possibly hospital as well, who would
grant these patients' request.
Professor Smith reports one court decision which recognized the extent of
the burden to a patient from having to transfer to another hospital.10 3 In
this instance, a Catholic-affiliated hospital would not accept the refusal of a
patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's Disease) to be tube
fed. "o'
The court ruled that this burden outweighed even the importance of
protecting careproviders' emotional sensibilities, because these sensibilities
were " 'subordinate to the psychological' pain and trauma the transfer of the
dying patient would bring to the patient."' '
But what if a physician could anticipate the conflict but fails to give this
"warning?" Such a physician would have some justification in not giving
this warning, because to the degree that his or her warning helped the patient find a physician who would carry out the act the physician considered
immoral,' the physician's beliefs would be violated. That is, physicians who
believe that life is absolutely sacred might feel that the assistance given a
patient to find another physician who would help the patient die by providing an early warning would be morally objectionable.
Yet, when doctors could give a warning but do not, they incur some obligation to offset the unnecessary harm they caused by failing to act. This
obligation to the patient and to the physician's own values would conflict.
Since physicians arguably have made an implicit a prioripromise when becoming doctors to subordinate some of their own interests to their patients',
their obligation to such patients probably should override their personal values in this instance.
103. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 169 n.299 (citing In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super.
443, 444, 517 A.2d 869, 870 (App. Div. 1986)).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing In re Reguena, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 445, 517 A.2d 869, 870 (App. Div.
1986)). See generally E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (1981).
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CHAPTER THREE: PERSONHOOD, BRAIN DEATH LEGISLATION AND
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

In Chapter Three, Professor Smith presents several criteria for personhood. In light of these criteria, he then discusses brain-death legislation,
living wills, and the durable power of attorney.
In his discussion of brain-death criteria, Professor Smith states that death
is best understood as a gradual deterioration of multiple parts of the body in
which some parts die sooner than others.1 6 He asserts that the current
medico-legal criteria for brain death have "one great practical merit": They
endeavor to place the moment of death earlier in the deterioration of life
than was previously permitted.1 "7 He believes that this and other legal developments are "clear and unmistakable evidence" that complex social
mechanisms are now establishing the right of individuals to participate in
decisions regarding their own death.'0 8 While passive euthanasia and rational suicide presently are "offensive words," autonomy and enlightened
self-determination are not.' ° 9
Advance Directives
Advance directives have much enhanced patients' opportunity to influence their future care. Although their use has increased greatly over recent
years, their development still must be regarded as in its infancy.
Living wills, for example, sometimes refer only to interventions which patients do not want." 0 Permitting patients to add interventions they want
would seem a significant step forward. This step is controversial, however,
because some interventions patients want might be "medically futile." One
patient, for example, with terminal cancer and progressive deterioration of
multiple organs had indicated prior to becoming irreversibly comatose that
she would want all possible interventions, including total parenteral nutrition (TPN). 1" The entire staff opposed TPN, but gave it regardless, because
they believed that legally, they had no other choice.
Living wills also tend to involve only patients who have a terminal ill106. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 79.
107. Id. at 80.

108. Id.
109. Id
110. Emanuel & Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care
Document, 261 J. A.M.A. 3288, 3289 (1989).
111. Total Parenteral Nutrition (TPN) refers to the provision of all nutrition through a
central venous line as opposed to reso-gastric tube or tube placed surgically directly into the
stomach. This means of providing nutrition creates some risk of bleeding or pneumothorax
(collapse of a lung) in placement of the tube, and, subsequently, of infection and thrombosis.

472

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:437

ness.' 12 It would seem another important next step to permit more patients
with non-terminal illnesses to write living wills. This change also would be
controversial, since there is disagreement regarding the conditions under
which persons with non-terminal illness should be allowed to die.
The appointment of proxy decisionmakers through the durable power of
attorney is another significant development. Persons who are appointed substitute decisionmakers, however, may have never discussed with patients
their future wishes. Even when they know patients well, they may predict
poorly what patients would want." 3 Further, those who have discussed
with patients their specific
preferences may be less willing than patients to
114
terminate patients' care.
Several approaches have been recommended to ameliorate these difficulties. In addition to physicians possibly asking both terminal and certain
non-terminal patients what they would and would not want, doctors can also
ask patients what general values, such as dying with dignity or being free
from pain, are most important to them. 115
When physicians should ask patients such questions, and to what extent,
is uncertain." 6 Very specific questions such as whether a patient would accept brief intubation during CPR but not afterwards, or brief ICU care after
CPR but not afterwards, could be useful, but some physicians believe that
asking patients such specific 7questions may unduly frighten and perhaps
even physically harm them. 1
CHAPTER FOUR: EUTHANASIA
In Chapter Four, Professor Smith begins his discussion of euthanasia by
pointing out that the most common fear among seriously ill patients is that
they will die under protracted circumstances in a hospital."' 8 Because patients are "victims" of modern technology to an ever increasing extent, 119
society has a corresponding, greater obligation to treat its members
112. Emanuel, supra note 110.

113. Uhlmann, Pearlman & Cain, Physicians and Spouses' Prediction of Elderly Patients'
Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M 115, M 115 (1988).
114. Steiber, Right to Die: Public Balks at Decidingfor Others, 61 HOSPITALS 72, 72
(1987).
115. Emanuel & Emanuel, Living Wills: Past, Present & Future, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS
(1990) (in press).
116. Id.
117. Doctors have voiced this concern to the author, for example, in a discussion as to
whether physicians should ask patients with HIV infection who were asymptomatic their preferences regarding advance directives. These physicians feared that such discussions might
shatter these patients' "healthy denial" and hope, and possibly exacerbate their illness.
118. FinalChoices, supra note 1, at 89.
119. Id.
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"kindly.'

2

At times however, merely allowing patients to die is not being

kind.121

What justification is there for treating patients when it causes them suffer' He offers several possible responses and then rebuts each of them.
ing? "22
Omission vs. Commission
One response is based on the assumption that acts of commission are significantly different from acts of omission. Professor Smith asserts that "in
antiquity" doctors were not permitted to terminate a life, but also were not
required to prolong it.' 23 Acts such as turning off a respirator may be accurately classified as commission or omission.' 2 ' The crucial element, however, in determining whether such an act is justified is not its classification,
but its motive.' 25 The motive of an act can and should be objectively assessed.'26 So long as the doer is attempting to relieve suffering and will not
27
incur personal gain, the act should be presumed to be morally permissible. 1
The Principleof Double Effect
A second response is based on the principle of double or indirect effect.
Professor Smith gives two examples in which this principle could be applied:
When a physician removes a cancerous, fetus-bearing uterus, and when a
physician administers pain-relieving medication that could produce respiratory depression and death.' 28 This principle has been attacked on the
ground that it can excuse wrongful acts and has been supported on the
ground that it is psychologically valid.' 29 For the reasons discussed previously, Professor Smith declares that the latter claim seems "dubious, at
be replaced by
best," and concludes that the double effect principle should
30
the "simple and enduring" criterion: what is reasonable.'
But what is reasonable? Professor Smith states that in general, an unyielding a prioristatement cannot be made since what is reasonable inevitably will
depend on the facts of each case. 31 Notwithstanding this disclaimer, a rea120. Id. at 91.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 96.
Id at 96-97.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 173.
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sonable person would consider treatment refusal unreasonable if the treatment could effectively treat the patient's condition - though not necessarily
save the patient's life - but not give rise to any significant patient objection
based on physical or mental burden; familial, social, or economic concern; or
religious belief.132
Legal Precedents
Professor Smith next reviews twelve American court decisions regarding
euthanasia 133 and describes international perspectives. 1 34 He discusses in
more detail the practice in the Netherlands.13 5 After a patient repeatedly
requests euthanasia, a second physician must verify that the patient is dying.
Then, a team of careproviders, which includes a religious authority, reviews
the patient's situation and assesses the patient's alternatives, one of which is
36
euthanasia. 1
Professor Smith asserts that if the United States adopted a policy similar
to the Dutch policy, a competent patient who wanted to carry out rational
suicide or euthanasia would be viewed as exercising enlightened self-determination. 3 7 When a surrogate decisionmaker chose euthanasia for a patient
who was incompetent, the only pertinent question would be whether the
decisionmaker had acted rationally, humanely, and consistently with the pa38
tient's best interests.'
CHAPTER FIVE: DNR

ORDERS AND WITHHOLDING AND

WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING INTERVENTIONS

In Chapter Five, Professor Smith discusses several recent developments
regarding DNR orders and withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging
treatments. He maintains that these developments, considered as a whole,
39
are incremental steps towards passive euthanasia.'
132. Id.
133. Id. at 106. Only one case, involving a man who killed his six-month old son, resulted

in a conviction.
134. Id Professor Smith points out that Switzerland, Uruguay, Peru, and Germany allow
physicians to assist a suicide. Id. at 118 n.163 (citing M. HEIFETZ, THE RIGHT To DIE 96
(1975)).

135. Id. at 107. For a description of recent developments, see de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 J. A.M.A. 3316 (1989).
136. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 107-08.
137. Id. at 108.
138. Id. at 108-09.
139. Id. at 119-20.

Final Choices

1990]

Hopelessly Ill Patients
Initially, he describes the 1976 Massachusetts General Hospital Protocol
on Optimal Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients." 4 Under this protocol, primary physicians ostensibly have ultimate authority over decisions regarding
their patients.141 This authority appears to be mitigated by further provisions which allow the Intensive Care Director to go directly to the Chief of
Service and request ethics committee consultation.' 4 2
These latter provisions exemplify Professor Smith's procedural recommendation that ethics committees should resolve most difficult questions.
Institutional efforts of this nature present a model for effective and
principled decision making. They also structure a verifiable process for evaluating the costs and benefits of 'treatment and nontreatment and thereby aid not only the health care providers in
their decision making, but also the family members or surrogate
decision makers who are advised, consulted or approve the ultimate decision.' 4 3
DNR Policy
He subsequently reviews the new DNR policy in New York State."' According to Professor Smith, this policy is the most balanced and comprehensive effort to date defining and strengthening the rights of persons with
serious illness.' 4 5 Under this policy, an attending physician must obtain a
patient's consent prior to issuing a DNR order, except when the patient may
be seriously harmed by this discussion, as when the patient has an arrythmia
and discussion could trigger a cardiac arrest, or the patient is severely paranoid and depressed, and discussion could provoke a patient's suicide.' 46 The
policy also requires patients to agree with the DNR order and does not permit physicians, themselves, to decide that CPR would be futile. 147
Therapeutic Privilege
The therapeutic exceptions in the New York policy limit patients' autonomy for paternalistic reasons similar to those Professor Smith criticizes in
140. Id. at 120-21.
141. Id. at 121.

142. Id.
143. Id.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

121-25.
124.
122.
122-23.
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other contexts. 4 ' Physicians' therapeutic privilege in this and other instances permits doctors to not inform patients fully when they believe that
149
information might seriously, unduly harm patients.
Is it true, however, that if physicians ask patients with a heart arrythmia
or with paranoid and depressed feelings to consent to a DNR order, those
questions will be more likely to harm them than if physicians do not ask? If
physicians choose not to ask patients their preference, patients could perceive that these doctors were withholding information. Patients also might
infer from these physicians' silence that the patients' conditions were more
grave than they are.
In addition, patients could feel emotionally isolated. Professor Smith indicates (in Chapter One) when he discusses the etiology of suicide, that the
feeling of isolation can be more painful than most other emotions and is
often a factor contributing to suicide.'
"Perhaps the most common denominator of suicides is loneliness, a motive arising from marital discord,
sickness, unrequited love affairs, and non-social factors such as unemployment, divorce, widowhood, and imprisonment."'' The feeling of isolation
on a ward might be added to this list.
Patients who are fully informed could also even benefit, perhaps, as a result of feeling more in control. In one study, AIDS patients were asked to
52
respond after being asked their preferences regarding advance directives.'
A majority stated
that they felt better as a result of these discussions for just
53
this reason.'
Physicians wrongfully believing that patients cannot bear the truth is not
without precedent. Careproviders feared in the past that patients with cancer would be likely to kill themselves if physicians told them the truth regarding their illness, and consequently often withheld this information from
patients. 154 Over the past few decades, it has been recognized that this assumption is erroneous. Physicians now know that by telling patients the
55
truth, they can help most patients.
148. Id. at 122.

149. Id.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id.
152. Steinbrook, Lo, Moulton, Saika, Hollander & Volbering, Special Report/Preferences
of Homosexual Men with AIDSfor Life Sustaining Treatment, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 457,
459 (1986).
153. Id.
154. See generally Oken, What to Tell CancerPatients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175
J. A.M.A. 1120 (1961).
155. Novack, Plumer, Smith, Ochitill, Morrow & Bennett, Changes in Physicians'Attitudes
Toward Telling the Cancer Patient, 241 J. A.M.A. 897, 899 (1979).
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A good example of a patient benefiting from the truth involved a patient I
treated during my internship. This patient entered the hospital with severe
liver damage and kidney shutdown. Despite ongoing peritoneal dialysis for
his kidney failure, his condition continued to worsen. His wife stayed with
him almost twenty-four hours a day and as her husband's condition deteriorated, she grew increasingly critical and demanding of the medical staff.
I then informed the patient and his wife that many of the physicians aware
of the patient's condition believed that he would die, but that personally I
believed that he would recover. Both statements were true. Since the patient showed no sign of improving, most of the doctors believed that there
was no ground for hope. Yet, since the medical cause of his deterioration
was uncertain, I believed that he could recover.
After learning of the other physicians' opinions, the patient and his wife
began to share previously unexpressed positive feelings for one another. The
wife stopped criticizing the staff and instead carried out the caretaking functions previously performed by the staff. The patient's liver and kidney function improved and he subsequently left the hospital.
Anecdotal reports do not prove an assertion. It probably was coincidence
that the patient improved., Still, since the patient and his wife were criticizing the medical staff, they probably were denying the seriousness of his condition. Confronting the patient's denial, at the very least, did not harm him.
The patient's improvement, therefore, is a counter-example to the assumption underlying doctors' therapeutic privilege, that telling patients the truth
when patients have strong denial is most likely to do harm.
When, if ever, physicians should withhold information from a patient remains controversial. Some physicians believe that when doctors are in
doubt, they can gain some indication whether a patient could "tolerate" the
truth by asking the patient whether a hypothetical patient would want this
information. If the patient answers, "Yes," the patient can be told; if, "No,"
it is more likely that the patient's denial is severe and should be told, if at all,
at a later time.
Other physicians state that they have never seen a patient harmed by having been told the truth in a sensitive manner, and on this basis, argue that
physicians are never justified in exercising their therapeutic privilege. The
responses of these physicians' patients have not, however, been compared
with those of a control group. Thus, these physicians' "clinical experience"
is also anecdotal and has limited value.
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Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment from Terminally Ill or
Irreversibly Comatose Patients
Professor Smith points out that the AMA's 1986 Guidelines for Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment from Terminally Ill or Irreversibly Comatose Patients emphasizes the importance of
patients' quality of life by suggesting that when patients have lost their
"truly human qualities" or potential for relationships, the best treatment
may be none.' 5 6 As noted previously, an additional significant factor which
might have moral weight in such cases is the positive feelings of others for
the patient.
The Termination of Life Sustaining Treatment and Age-Based Rationing
Professor Smith subsequently reviews the Hastings Center's 1987
LINES ON TERMINATION

GUIDE-

OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND

THE

CARE OF THE DYING, and Dr. Daniel Callahan's book, SETTING LIMITS:
MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY.' 57 He praises both books, and,

particularly the tenet in the latter work that if a life-prolonging intervention
15 8
cannot benefit a patient, it should not be offered.
He challenges, however, Dr. Callahan's "refusal to accept elderly patients'
right to self-determination," the right, through legislation, to assisted suicide
or euthanasia.' 59 Whereas Dr. Callahan fears that this right might "serve as
a threatening symbol of [the] devaluation of old age," the opposite is true. 160
[T]o base a denial of full rights of self-determination for the elderly
on fears of what might happen demeans the whole value of autonomy and constricts its application to only approved or presently
legitimate purposes.... [I]t is the individual-regardlessof age or
infirmity-who should make the final determinations about his
61
health care or medical needs.'
HandicappedNewborns
Professor Smith strongly criticizes the final rule put forth in 1985 by the
Department of Health and Human Services regarding handicapped
newborns. 162 He suggests that when "treatment has a high probability of
156. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 126-28.
157. Id. at 132-34.
158. Id. at 134.

159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 135-36. For an opposing viewpoint, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (1989).
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causing suffering but a low probability of preserving a life valuable to the
patient," such persons probably should not be treated,163 and finds the discrepancy between the treatment of newborns effected by this rule and the
treatment of critically ill adults "alarming.""' This discrepancy may result
from adults having stronger feelings and aspirations for the young. 165 Regardless of the cause, Professor Smith believes that when patients are young
or old, cost-benefit considerations should be paramount when deciding what
treatments should be given or withheld. 166
Professor Smith ends this chapter by discussing several leading court cases
which involve the decision to allow a patient to die, such as the Saikewitz,
Convoy, and Bouvia decisions. 167 These opinions illustrate with "unremitting clarity" that increasingly courts are respecting acts of enlightened selfdetermination by competent patients and by surrogate decision-makers on
behalf of patients.161

CHAPTER SIX: PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
In Professor Smith's final chapter, he indicates the procedural means by
which he believes the substantive changes he has espoused could best be
implemented. 169 Advance directives may help considerably to further patients' autonomy, but inevitably circumstances will arise which neither physicians nor patients could forsee. 7 When such conflicts arise, an ethics
committee should attempt to reach a solution, and only if unsuccessful
17
should the conflict be brought before a court. '

He asserts, however, that if a court must be involved, the court should not
decide the outcome.' 7 2 Rather, a surrogate decisionmaker should be appointed and permitted wide decisionmaking discretion and authority, since
163. Id. at 135.
164. Id. at 136.

165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id. at 139-55. Professor Smith analyzes these cases: In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 1209 (1985); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1977); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and Nejdle v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (1983); Battling v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 136 Cal. App. 3d 186,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); In re Convoy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); and Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1986).
168. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 155.
169. Id. at 171-79.
170. Id. at 171.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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"expeditious and sensitive decision making" is, in general, "more obtainable
73
through intra-institutional processes than protracted judicial inquiry."'
Professor Smith does not address most specific aspects of ethics committee
functioning, because, as with guidelines regarding "what is reasonable," he
believes that the morally relevant factors may vary. 174 This claim appears
true. Some ethics committees appear to function most effectively, for example, if the physician, nurse, or patient bringing the dilemma presents it to the
entire committee; others seem to function most effectively if the physician,
nurse or patient bringing the dilemma presents it to only a few persons from
the committee who then present their findings to the entire committee.
Yet, the effectiveness of ethics committees also may depend on specific
factors. Three examples follow.
Who Can Request Ethics Committee Consultation
One important consideration is who can request an ethics committee consultation. In some hospitals, patients or staff can request that an ethics committee be involved, and patients are informed of this option. In other
institutions, a patient's attending physician is the only person who can request ethics committee involvement.
The latter approach enhances the likelihood that patients, physicians,
and/or nurses will resolve disagreements among themselves before the ethics
committee is involved. This approach places a greater burden on patients
and staff, however, to confront the attending physician directly. Patients
and staff may prefer to take no action rather than confront these physicians.
Patients may fear that if they disagree with their physician, conscious or
unconscious retaliation by the doctor may occur in the form of sub-optimal
care.
Whether the Committee is Advisory or Decision-making
A second important consideration is whether the ethics committee serves
primarily an advisory or decisionmaking role. An ethics committee may be
described as advisory but, in actuality, only be advisory if it offers several
alternatives rather than one and does not take a vote on these options. That
is, if an ethics committee indicates that only one approach is acceptable or
gives a majority and minority opinion, physicians may fear - with some justification - that if they go against the committee's recommendation or majority view, they will be more vulnerable to being successfully sued.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 174.
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Who Should Attend Ethics Committee Discussions
An third important consideration is whether patients, their families, and/
or surrogate decisionmakers should be invited to participate in all ethics
committee discussions. If these parties are invited, ethic committee members may feel inhibited and not be completely honest. Furthermore, if ethics
committee members express their honest views, patients and their families
could feel traumatized and resentful.
The risk of traumatization can be minimized, however, if a careprovider
who knows the parties discusses their questions and emotional reactions immediately after the meeting. Inviting these parties also can reduce the suspicion that, when the committee meets "behind closed doors," the whole truth
is being kept from them. Finally, attendance by these parties enables them
to become both more medically and ethically informed.
An example in which the participation of a patient's spouse probably
would have been desirable occurred when a patient was in a coma and his
spouse was a nurse. The nurse found differences among doctors' reports to
her of her husband's prognosis upsetting, and suspected, accurately, that
these differences reflected uncertainty which the doctors were unwilling to
acknowledge. Had she attended the ethics committee's meetings when these
physicians presented their uncertainty, this might have reduced her distrust.
Who Should Attend "Prognosis Committees"
A related question which is, perhaps, more difficult, is whether patients,
their families and/or surrogate decisionmakers should be invited to attend
meetings in which physicians meet to discuss a patient's prognosis. While
there are valid objections to the presence of these parties, the gains from
their inclusion in at least the more important discussions may outweigh the
costs.
Inviting these parties to attend departs from customary practice, but it is
actually more consistent with ethical and legal norms. Ethically, if a consulting physician's opinion differs substantially from that of a referring physician, the consulting physician should assure that this difference is
communicated to the patient. Legally, if the consulting physician does not,
he or she could be sued for "abandonment."
Patients and their families may be frightened as a result of learning that
doctors disagree or are uncertain, but this fear can be minimized if a
careprovider meets with them after these discussions. On the other hand, if
these parties are included, they may better understand their physicians' dilemmas and, to some extent, even identify with the physicians. The result
could be enhanced rapport between these parties and physicians. If retro-
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spectively, physicians have made choices which harmed a patient, the parties
probably would be less likely to sue.175
Legal Liability
Professor Smith stresses the importance of physicians being free from fear
of civil and criminal liability when they permit or help patients to end their
lives. 17 6 Freedom from liability probably could be best achieved by the
staff's using a "team approach." 177 The "obvious parallel" is seen in the use
of a team in ethics and prognosis committees in the United States and the
way physicians carry out active euthanasia in Holland.
Professor Smith asserts that when persons such as Elizabeth Bouvia wish
to die but lack the ability to take their own life, a team approach is particularly advantageous. 178 Persons with non-terminal as well as terminal illness
who are suffering greatly should be permitted or assisted in ending their life,
but this should occur not only after committee review and an appropriate
179
trial of counseling.
CONCLUSION

Professor Smith predicts that in time most persons in this society will
agree with his views.1 8 ' If so, it will then be necessary to achieve consensus
on both substantive standards and procedural safeguards which would maximize patients' opportunity to exercise enlightened self-determination but
minimize the likelihood that these limits would be breached or abused.
By providing broad-based, deeply-grounded arguments for expanding patients' choices, Professor Smith has contributed most significantly to the
legal and moral debate on these questions which continues to grow. Others
no doubt will critique, refine, and further analyze Professor Smith's proposals. This outcome would itself, however, represent the reification of Professor Smith's hope - that in the not too distant future, passive euthanasia and
rational suicide cease being "offensive words," but rather, become options
self-evidently meriting this society's reflection.

175. See generally Ritchy, Case Management of Patients Perceived as Suit-Prone, 7 ETHICS
SC. MED. 37 (1980).
176. FINAL CHOICES, supra note 1, at 175.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 174-75. According to Professor Smith, referees or committees were advocated

as "the least cumbersome approach" to evaluating requests for euthanasia as far back as 1958.
Id.
179. Id.at 175-76.
180. Id. at 179-80.

